



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 March 2019

Ms. Emma Best  
MuckRock News  
DEPT MR 63428  
411A Highland Avenue  
Somerville, MA 02144

Reference: F-2019-00421

Dear Ms. Best:

This is a final response to your 8 November 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the following records: **files mentioning the anticipated breach of security mentioned in LOC-HAK-43-4-29-8, as well as CIA's response to the anticipated events and any actual ones.**

We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended. We conducted a search for records that would reveal an openly acknowledged affiliation and located one previously released document, consisting of five pages. A copy of the document is enclosed.

To the extent that your request also seeks records that would reveal a classified association between the CIA and the subject, if any exist, we can neither confirm nor deny having such records, pursuant to Section 3.6(a) of Executive Order 13526, as amended. If a classified association between the subject and this organization were to exist, records revealing such a relationship would be properly classified and require continued safeguards against unauthorized disclosure. You may consider this finding a denial of this portion of your request pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. In this case, the relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 3024(i)(1), as amended. I have enclosed an explanation of exemptions for your reference and retention. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions regarding our response, you may contact us at:

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505  
Information and Privacy Coordinator:  
703-613-3007 (Fax)

Please be advised that you may seek dispute resolution services from the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or from the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) of the National Archives and Records Administration. OGIS offers mediation services to help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies. You may reach CIA's FOIA Public Liaison at:

703-613-1287 (FOIA Hotline)

The contact information for OGIS is:

Office of Government Information Services  
National Archives and Records Administration  
8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS  
College Park, MD 20740-6001  
202-741-5770  
877-864-6448  
202-741-5769 (fax)  
[ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov)

Contacting the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Allison Fong', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Allison Fong  
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

## Explanation of Exemptions

### Freedom of Information Act:

- (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an Executive Order;
- (b)(2) exempts from disclosure information which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. The (b)(3) statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
- (b)(4) exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a person and that is privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) exempts from disclosure inter-and intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) exempts from disclosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
- (b)(7) exempts from disclosure information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that the production of the information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source or, in the case of information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual's life or physical safety;
- (b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for use of an agency responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
- (b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

April 2012

OGC SUBJ: WATERGATE

12 December 1973

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO

SUBJECT : Seymour Hersh

1. Attached for your information and use with the Director is a tentative outline of a book which Seymour Hersh has submitted to at least two publishers, the NEW YORK TIMES and Random House. I have shown this to Greaney.

2. It is my understanding that Hersh was offered an advance of \$40,000 by the NEW YORK TIMES but has concluded negotiations with Random House for \$75,000.


3. 

Approved for Release  
Date 15-9-89

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4. Recently, I had a long distance telephone call from one of our ex-employees who also called Howard Osborne. The ex-employee stated that he had a long discussion by phone from Hersh and wished to alert me that Hersh had seen a number of our ex-employees and had made considerable inroads into sensitive areas of Agency activity.

5. I believe it would be useful if we could meet at some early date to explore further the implications of Hersh's activities and his future book. Some consideration might be given to warning employees and ex-employees of their security oath. They should know that "publication" also entails communication, verbal or otherwise, even to journalists.

James Angleton  
Chief  
Counterintelligence Operations

Attachment:  
As Stated

Tentative Outline for an Untitled Work on Intelligence;  
Estimated Length of 75,000 Words; Manuscript Ready by  
Early Fall 1973 (Seymour M. Hersh)

General Thesis: that the United States still maintains a dangerous cold-war intelligence network that is, for all intents, out of the control of Washington bureaucracy. Estimated cost of the program - \$8 billion.

An opening chapter would spell out the thesis, and also make clear that many highly held American secrets are being revealed precisely to demonstrate what is meant by cold war intelligence. One glaring first chapter example: a closely held project known as Holy Stone, operated by the Navy, in which American submarines have been penetrating the Soviet 3-mile off-shore limit since the early 1960's to get high quality photographic and electronic intelligence. Our submarines have spent time inside the Soviet nuclear submarine pens at Murmansk and Vladivostok. Nixon and Kissinger have spent many hours observing photographs taken from these operations which many in the government think are crazy. Typical problem: one of our subs ran aground in 1970 off Murmansk for two hours; Kissinger personally handled the crisis. The sub got off because a Soviet shore patrol opened fire. Asked about the incident, one high American official laughed and said, "The Russians are coming; the Russians are coming." The Navy briefs the program as if the Russians don't know of it; a thesis that others find laughable. Query: Why is a dangerous project like this, which produces little that can't be learned from satellites, still going?

Second chapter would unveil the top secret (actually far higher in classification than that - something known as byeman) national reconnaissance office (nro), which was set up by President Kennedy in the wake of the U-2 incident in 1960. The nro controls all of the U.S. satellite targeting and directing. Its budget: \$2 - \$3 billion a year. The office, which has a staff of about 15 to 20, is run out the Assistant Air Force secretary for research and development. That Assistant, who deals with the press and congress as a research officials, is really one of the government's most elaborate fronts - in fact he is the man who controls the nro. The

other two members are the Department Secretary of Defense and Kissinger. All of the purchasing, designing and ordering of satellites is done out of this office. It is never reviewed by congress. Ergo - costs overrun on the satellites "make the C5A look like a piker." I have interviewed two former members of the nro, with copious details.

Another chapter would deal with the CIA and explain what really goes on. Where the budget is hidden; what the agents think; why some agents tried to form an intelligence officers' association in 1971 (but where stopped cold). [The real story behind the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS.] The story of one agent who challenged the system.

I also will deal with the national security agency in a manner never before attempted. Interview, in depth, with a Harvard professor who spent 27 years doubling as an NSA official. What the NSA really does. How it keeps track on every major government official. Its incompetence, wastefulness and arrogance. One major intelligence official told me that the NSA couldn't fill 10 pages with a list of its accomplishments.

There also will be a chapter on the defense intelligence agency, which is the laughingstock of the intelligence bureaucracy. Will tell why. Incidents such as the time the DIA mistook shifting sands in the Sahara for Russian nuclear missile sites (I'm serious; this really happened). Perhaps something on what really went wrong on the Son Tay raid (although the book will generally avoid Vietnam).

Another chapter will deal with the control mechanism, and how they fail. The secret 40 committee, which overviews all covert intelligence programs. The secret joint reconnaissance committee, which handles covert operations for the joint chiefs of staff. A different point of view on the Pueblo incident, which was approved as a covert n. s. a. operation by both the 40 committee and the j. r. c. without one official ever hearing of the program. How? Because those important committees often don't meet but have their secretaries log entries indicating that sessions took place.

At some point, perhaps early in the book, I will unveil a number of highly classified intelligence operations in the United States such as

[the media agency in New York that really is a cover for the CIA] of the fact that [the CIA has a domestic operations division which operates in 40 U.S. cities promoting the aim of clandestine warfare]. There will be special attention to the use of journalists and newspapers as front operations by the intelligence people all over the world. [A London news agency, e. g., controlled by the CIA that puts out "black propaganda" all over the world.]

The unraveling. Why people are speaking out. Interviews with former intelligence people who are now telling their stories. What the government is doing to stop it. The Marchetti case in details. Including what happened at the secret court hearing that resulted in an unprecedented restraining order against his publishing of anything.

Finally, how the White House acted on the inevitable dilemma caused by intelligence. Details, never before printed, of the secret 18-month White House study, at Nixon's direction, of the intelligence problems facing those who want to stop the intelligence juggernaut.

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The material is rough, but abundant. I estimate about 40 to 50 more interviews are needed (with men who served on the submarines that went inside Russian shores, for example: and many more CIA types). No documents will be used or published by me; thus far I am working solely from personal interviews, and reconstructing first-hand and original source material.

I'm convinced this book could cause major reforms in the intelligence business. I also am sure that no significant details will find their way into print, solely because of the classification.